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BENIGN RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS: A GUIDE FOR
TRANSPORTATION ATTORNEYS
Walter A. McFarlane*
Just prior to its adjournment in 1982, and subsequent to hotly
contested debates, the 97th Congress enacted the Surface Trans-
portation Assistance Act of 1982 (STAA).1 The Act contained a
number of controversial provisions, not the least of which was one
requiring that "not less than 10 per centum of the amounts author-
ized to be appropriated" by the act were to be expended on small
business "owned and controlled by socially and economically dis-
advantaged individuals ... ."2 Such small businesses have become
known, as disadvantaged business enterprises, or DBE's.
Congress' sole reference and guide for future implementation of
its mandate is contained in the short statement in section 105(f) of
STAA.3 As a result of this lack of direction, a significant number of
questions have arisen regarding not only Congress' intent, but also
the constitutionality of its mandate and the states' statutory, con-
stitutional and practical ability to carry out that mandate.
This article's purpose is to suggest the probable intent of Con-
gress, to offer practical considerations that are necessary for the
successful implementation of a DBE program, and finally, to dis-
cuss the philosophical, statutory and constitutional issues at the
federal and state levels. This commitment is undertaken with the
full understanding that more questions may be raised than
* Deputy Attorney General, Finance and Transportation Division, Virginia Attorney
General's Office; B.A., 1962, Emory and Henry College; J.D., 1966, T.C. Williams School of
Law, University of Richmond. The opinions and conclusions in this article are those of the
author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Virginia Attorney General's Office.
1. Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-424, § 105(f), 96 Stat.
2097, 2100 (1982).
2. Except to the extent that the Secretary determines otherwise, not less than 10 per
centum of the amounts authorized to be appropriated under this Act shall be ex-
pended with small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economi-
cally disadvantaged individuals as defined by section 8(d) of the Small Business Act
(15 U.S.C. section 637(d)) and relevant subcontracting regulations promulgated pur-
suant thereto.
Id.
3. Id.
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answered.
I. SECTION 105(F) OF THE STAA
What was Congress' intent when it enacted section 105(f) of
STAA? Did it intend the program to be a haphazard shot in the
arm of DBE's, or did it intend to enable DBE's to compete in the
open market? The latter appears to be the more logical conclusion
for two reasons. First, it is clear that the highway construction field
lacks a significant number of DBE's. 4 Second, Congress cross-refer-
enced section 8(d) of the Small Business Act 5 and the "relevant
subcontracting regulations promulgated pursuant there to"' for
further definition of its intent. Since the history of the Small Busi-
ness Act demonstrates an attempt to place minorities on a compet-
itive footing with majority firms, the same purpose can be logically
imputed to the enactment of section 105(f).7
Assuming this congressional intent, it is incumbent upon state
governments to approach the DBE program in a manner that will
help DBE's establish a sound base for future competition. Failure
to do so will only enrich those firms already participating in high-
way construction and deter potential new DBE's which desire to
organize but lack the capital, training and experience to do so. It is
axiomatic that the enrichment of present DBE's will not increase
the number of competitive firms. In fact, unless firms are created
nationwide, arguably there will not be sufficient DBE's to meet the
congressional mandate. The creation and success of new firms will
not be an easy undertaking even with the congressional guarantee
of contracts."
Federal aid alone cannot create viable DBE's and cure the prob-
lem of the small number of DBE's competing for federally assisted
4. Cf. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 475 (1980) (recognizing the impaired access of
minority businesses to public contracting opportunities).
5. Small Business Act § 8(d), 15 U.S.C. § 637(d) (1982). Section 8(d)(1) establishes the
policy of the United States "that small business concerns, and small business concerns
owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, shall have the
maximum practicable opportunity to participate in the performance of contracts let by any
Federal agency.. . ." The remaining provisions of section 8(d) of the Small Business Act
outline procedures for awarding federal contracts which are designed to achieve this policy.
6. Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 § 105(f).
7. See Drabkin, Minority Enterprise Development and the Small Business Administra-
tion's Section 8(a) Program: Constitutional Basis and Regulatory Implementation, 49
BROOKLYN L. REV. 433 (1983).
8. Id.
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contracts. For example, "[o]nly four per cent, or 166 of the 4,598
firms admitted to the (section 8(a)) program, have graduated as
competitive and self-sufficient businesses."9 Instead of seeking
competitive status, many of these firms have oriented their atten-
tion to merely "attaining noncompetitive section 8(a) contracts."1
This behavior is caused by the incentives of such a program. A
preference program such as the section 8(a) effort may initially
place a DBE firm in a limited competition setting, allowing it to
demand more payment and more profit than its open market com-
petitors. However, if a DBE is to survive outside of the program, it
must learn to compete outside of this limited setting. Otherwise,
when the DBE preference is abrogated by Congress, the firm will
not understand competition in the real marketplace, which can be
fatal to a firm's continued existence. Such firms must avoid becom-
ing "set-aside contract junkies."'1
Responsible government dictates that incentives be created to
entice the DBE to seek competitive status; otherwise, when the
section 105(f) money is exhausted, the DBE firm will collapse or
find itself just as disadvantaged as it was prior to entering the pro-
gram.12 In fact, it is possible that those firms that were successful
when they entered the program could become so dependent on the
preferences offered under the DBE programs that they will fall
into the trap of dependence and, thereby, lose their competitive
edge."3
Even if a DBE learns competitive techniques and develops man-
agement skills, it can still find itself at a disadvantage in the open
market. In the construction industry, unless the DBE has estab-
lished a sound reputation as a solid qualified contractor, prime
contractors may subcontract to other contractors with better repu-
tations. This situation is common:
The federal government is a prime example of the phenomenon of
customer preference for products and services of particular firms
with established reputations .... Approximately sixty-four percent
of the Department of Defense dollar volume of procurement in fiscal
9. Id. at 448 (citing COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE US. REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: THE
SBA 8(A) PROCUREMENT PROGRA-A PROMISE UNFULFILLED GAO Report CED 81-55 (Apr.
8, 1981) [hereinafter cited as A PROMISE UNFULFILLED]).
10. Drabkin, supra note 7, at 448-49.
11. Id. at 467 (citing A PRONUSE UNFULFILLED, supra note 9, at 15-19).
12. Drabkin, supra note 7, at 448.
13. Id.
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1980 was noncompetitive in nature. It was either sole source or fol-
low-on after design or price competition. 4
These extraordinary figures suggest that a new firm which has not
yet established its reputation may find it difficult to break into
federal government procurement.'5 However, this problem of cus-
tomer preference probably does not occur at the state highway
contract level, where the majority of contracts are advertised for
bid to the lowest responsible bidder. Nonetheless, since subcon-
tracts awarded by prime contractors are frequently not bid com-
petitively, the prime could look to reputation rather than price.
While reputation is important, experience leads this writer to
believe that price plays a more important role than reputation
when a prime is choosing a subcontractor. Obviously, the prime
will not look at price alone, because he must assure that the work
will be properly performed. In addition, he must be convinced that
the subcontractor will work with the other contractors on the pro-
ject and complete the project without incident or delay. Neverthe-
less, price is a very important factor. Consequently, new firms
must be able to compete on price. This may be difficult because
"new firms with a small scale of operation [may] have higher per-
unit costs than larger firms already entrenched in the market-
place."'" The larger the firm, the more capable it is of using "more
efficient machinery and more efficient labor and management func-
tions." Larger firms also buy in larger quantities, enabling them
to purchase supplies at a lower price and pass savings on to their
customers. In addition, new, small firms may have to pay interest
rates higher than those paid by established firms,' 8 and supplier
credit may also be more difficult to arrange. 9 These are but a few
of the problems that face new DBE firms.
The past experience of contractors who have built their firms
from the ground up can prove invaluable to DBE's. Recognizing
this potential tool, Commissioner Hal King of the Virginia Depart-
14. Id. at 462 (citing U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVS., DIREc-
TOR FOR INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND REPORTS, 100 LARGEST DEFENSE CONTRACTORS AND
THEIR SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS, FISCAL YEAR (1980)).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 463.
18. Id. at 464. Discussions with contractors also confirm this.
19. Id. Recent conferences with DBE's confirm this. This problem is not peculiar to
DBE's; it has always been a factor in the highway construction field.
[Vol. 19:29
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ment of Highways and Transportation is currently promoting the
"mentor-protege" concept. By taking DBE firms under their wings,
established contractors can help with both management and tech-
nical advice.20 This "mentor-protege" approach can also involve
other methods, such as low interest loans or stock purchases, which
can help DBE firms develop a solid foundation for competition.
These methods, however, must be carefully implemented so that
the DBE is truly independent and not a clone of the mentor.
Even with these various types of assistance, companies entering
the highway construction field for the first time must have pa-
tience. They must be prepared to wait between four and eleven
years before they "reach a positive operating profit, and between
nine and twenty years for cumulative profits to become positive."21
I. THE PHILOSOPHY OF REVERSE DISCRIMINATION 22 OR BENIGN
RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS
It is clear that the section 105(f) program is to be implemented
on the basis of racial classifications. It is designed to benefit small
businesses owned and controlled by socially and economically dis-
advantaged individuals. Whether the Constitution will support
such use of racial classifications for benign, non-discriminatory
purposes to benefit a race has been one of the most debated con-
cepts facing students of the Constitution for the past ten years. As
will be discussed below,23 prior to 1980 whenever a racial classifica-
tion was employed to discriminate against or to disfavor a particu-
lar race, the Supreme Court viewed such a classification with a
jaundiced eye and employed a strict scrutiny test which proved fa-
tal to all but two such classifications.2 " The question then arose
20. Care must be taken that these "mentor-protege" relationships are not improperly
used. The protege must have the controlling interest in the firm and perform a commercially
useful function.
21. Drabkin, supra note 7, at 454 (citing SBA, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON VENTURE
AND EQUrrY CAPITAL FOR SMALL BusiNEss 5 (1977)).
22. The term "reverse discrimination" as it is used today means that instead of steps
being taken to discriminate against minorities, steps are taken to grant special treatment to
minorities. Professor Jones takes issue with the use of the term "reverse discrimination." He
argues that the term is "a popular misconception... a buzz word [which] clearly carries a
pejorative connotation [but] is rarely accompanied by any legal analysis." Jones, "Reverse
Discrimination" in Employment: Judicial Treatment of Affirmative Action Programs in
the United States, 25 How. L.J. 217 (1982).
23. See infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
24. See Phillips, Neutrality and Purposiveness in the Application of Strict Scrutiny to
Racial Classifications, 55 TEmp. L.Q. 317, 323-24 (1982).
1984]
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whether the same standard should be employed when a benefit
rather than a detriment is being bestowed upon minorities. 25
Justice Powell, in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke,26 cites an article by Professor Bickel which sums up the
view taken by many who disfavor benign racial classifications. Pro-
fessor Bickel points out that until the benign classification issue
reached the Supreme Court, the Court had consistently held racial
classifications to be patently unconstitutional. Now, he asserts,
this is to be unlearned and we are told that this is not a matter of
fundamental principle but only a matter of whose ox is being gored.
Those for whom racial equality was demanded are to be more equal
than others. Having found support in the Constitution for equality,
they now claim support for inequality under the same
Constitution.27
A number of questions arise when reviewing the philosophical
acceptability of benign classifications. For example, when a prefer-
ence is granted to a particular group and that preference is found
to be constitutional, what criteria should be used to determine
when to discontinue the preference? What standard will be in-
voked to determine whether, from a societal, employment or other
standpoint, the minorities are now actually equal both in opportu-
nities and societal acceptance? It appears that the Supreme Court
will be forced to make such decisions and the basis of those deci-
sions will be subjective. The Court's decision on these issues will be
subjective because it cannot evaluate the true conditions that exist.
This is no condemnation of its ability, but merely a statement of
practical reality. Whatever criteria the Court adopts to judge the
success of a benign classification must be subjective.28
The following discussion points out the philosophical pros and
cons surrounding benign classifications. The writer recognizes that
there are many scholars who have voiced a myriad of opinions on
25. This issue has resulted in five cases in which the Court has approached the problem,
but has given no clear analysis or guidance. See infra notes 121-42 and accompanying text.
26. 438 U.S. 265, 295 (1978).
27. A. BICKEL, THE MOALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975). See also Christian Sci. Monitor,
Sept. 20, 1983, at 4, col. 1 (interview with Clarence M. Pendleton, Jr., Chairman of the Civil
Rights Commission, where he assails affirmative action and supports a color blind
approach).
28. It is well-accepted that there are those who now believe there is no discrimination
that warrants a remedy.
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the subject; however, as a matter of journalistic perogative, the po-
sitions of two writers on the subject will be emphasized.
A. Support for Preferential Programs
Professor Nickel, in an article concerning preferential hiring
practices, introduces and discusses three separate rationales for ap-
proaching the issues: (1) compensatory justice, (2) distributive jus-
tice and (3) utility.29 It should be noted that Professor Nickel did
not invent these rationales. "Aristotle articulated the principles of
rectification (compensatory justice) and distributive justice, and
utilitarianism was set out by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart
Mill. 30
1. Compensatory Justice
"Compensatory justice awards reparations for past injury. Its
aim is to make whole those who were injured by putting them
where they would have been 'but for' the injustices suffered. 31
This rationale faces the initial hurdle that "some of the injury for
which compensation is sought was inflicted on persons long since
dead. ' 32 Professor Duncan argues, however, that it is impossible to
separate past and present injury.33 According to this hypothesis,
present day conditions would not exist "but for" the results of
prior history.
If one accepts the proposition that compensation is owed, the
next question becomes to whom is that compensation owed? Is it
owed to all members of the racial group or only to those who have
been harmed substantially by discrimination and hardship? 34 Is a
person who was once harmed by discrimination, but who has since
overcome that harm through his own effort, also entitled to repara-
tion? 5 Should governments, companies or individuals compensate
for these losses even though there is no evidence that they caused
29. Nickel, Preferential Policies on Hiring and Admissions: A Jurisprudential Approach,
75 COLUM. L. Rxv. 534 (1975).
30. Duncan, The Future of Affirmative Action: A Jurisprudential Legal Critique, 17
HARv. CR-C.. L. REv. 503, 510 (1982). This is an excellent article which further discusses
and applies these rationales.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 510-11.
34. Nickel, supra note 29, at 537.
35. Id.
1984]
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the loss?3 6
Professor Nickel argues that the only ones "who have a right to
compensation are those who have personally been injured by dis-
crimination and who have yet not been able to overcome this in-
jury. '3 7 Other commentators disagree. Professor Duncan concludes
that "because discrimination was and is suffered by black individu-
als solely because of their membership in the group of blacks, com-
pensation is due purely on the basis of membership in that
group." 8 Although Professor Nickel believes not everyone in the
group is entitled to compensation, he supports reparation to the
group based upon administrative convenience.3 9 Professor Duncan,
on the other hand, disagrees with the idea that administrative con-
venience is the sole justification for group compensation. 40 He be-
lieves those who have overcome the harm are equally deserving of
compensation because in reaching their success, they have suffered
discrimination.4'
In direct contrast to the approaches of Duncan and Nickel, there
are those who cannot support compensation solely because of one's
race.42 This view holds that for a person to recover, he must
demonstrate that he is one from which the spoils were actually
taken.43
There are also commentators who favor compensation but not in
the form of preferential treatment. 44 Their approach favors repara-
tive efforts such as special training programs, head start activities,
financial aid and community improvement programs.45 The idea is
36. Id.
37. Id. at 539.
38. Duncan, supra note 30, at 511, 513-14. Cf. Taylor, Reverse Discrimination and Com-
pensatory Justice, 33 ANALYsIs 177 (1973) (supporting Duncan's view in part). But see
Cowan, Inverse Discrimination, 33 ANALYSIS 10, 12 (1972); Goldman, Limits to the Justifi-
cation of Reverse Discrimination, 3 Soc. THEORY & PRACTICE 289 (1975). See also Cohen,
Why Racial Preference is Illegal and Immoral, COMMENTARY, June 1979, at 40, 42 (arguing
that title VII of the Civil Rights Act forbids deliberate racial discrimination in all cases
except those where it is necessary to redress "identifiable persons" injured by discrimination
and where the party inflicting the injury is the same party that makes them whole).
39. Nickel, Should Reparations Be To Individuals or to Groups?, 34 ANALYSIS 154 (1974).
40. Duncan, supra note 30, at 516.
41. Id.
42. Cohen, supra note 38, at 43-44.
43. Id.
44. Lipset & Schneider, The Bakke Case: How Would it be Decided at the Bar of Public
Opinion, PUBLIC OPINION, March/April 1978, at 38, 44.
45. Id. at 41.
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to give special consideration without preferential treatment."'
2. Distributive Justice
Under this precept, benefits as well as burdens are "distributed
in accordance with relevant considerations such as the rights,
deserts, merits, contributions and needs of the recipients. ' 47 An in-
dividual is entitled to preference not as a reparation for past
wrongs but solely because "he or she deserves a greater share of
community resources. ' 48 Once again, however, the question arises
as to whether the entire group or only those who can demonstrate
injury are entitled to preference.
Professor Duncan supports group entitlement. He argues that:
(1) the fact that one has, for example, received a quality education
does not immunize that person from discrimination, (2) adminis-
trative convenience dictates it and (3) there are clear examples of
"unmistakable large scale inequality of opportunity" and the per-
vasiveness of the inequality requires a group remedy.49
Professor Nickel, on the other hand, points out that such a the-
ory is unrealistic.50 He asserts that too many other factors could
have contributed to inequality and it is impossible to sort out these
other influences from those caused by discrimination. 51 In addi-
tion, this approach is potentially underinclusive. Although distrib-
utive justice attempts to allocate benefits and burdens among all of
society, disadvantaged whites would not benefit if relief is aimed
solely at minorities.52
3. Social Utility
The rationale underlying the social utility theory is that the
overall public good will be promoted by reducing poverty and ine-
quality.53 "Since neither past nor present discrimination need be
46. Id. at 44.
47. Duncan, supra note 30, at 520.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 523-24.
50. Nickel, supra note 29, at 540.
51. Id. at 539.
52. It should be noted that the implementation of the STAA has not precluded whites.
Whites may participate if they qualify as disadvantaged.
53. Duncan, supra note 30, at 524; Nickel, supra note 29, at 541. See also Posner, The
Defunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities,
1974 Sup. CT. Rv. 1, 16.
1984]
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shown, this theory presents fewer justification problems than the
two theories" previously discussed."
How does preferential treatment help society as a whole? It in-
creases employment and educational opportunities, alleviating
poverty "and its attendant evils by eliminating the sort of eco-
nomic inequality that leads to resentment and strife. '55
In addition, it promotes the development of role models within a
minority group which, in turn, suggests the opportunities that are
available while encouraging self improvement.56 Preferential treat-
ment also creates a more diverse society, allowing the free ex-
change of opinions and knowledge.
Finally, it is argued that educational and employment opportu-
nities will help provide legal and medical services for disadvan-
taged minorities.57 This conclusion presumes that minority profes-
sionals will provide their services to disadvantaged minorities,
which may or may not be true. Professor Nickel defends such pref-
erential treatment, however, on the theory that minority lawyers
and doctors are more likely to help meet the legal and medical
needs of the minority community than are white lawyers and
doctors.58
B. General Objections to Affirmative Action
Notwithstanding the specific criticisms of the three approaches
highlighted above,59 there remain several general philosophical ob-
jections that may be lodged against preferential programs.
1. The Competency of Minorities
Some argue that granting less qualified people jobs, promotions
and educational opportunities will lower the standards and the
quality of services provided.6 0 "Those who are opposed to preferen-
54. Duncan, supra note 30, at 524.
55. Nickel, supra note 29, at 541. It is axiomatic that poverty and discrimination en-
courage crime, family strife, lack of self confidence and social tension. Id.
56. See Duncan, supra note 30, at 525.
57. Id. at 526; Nickel, supra note 29, at 541.
58. Nickel, supra note 29, at 542.
59. It is recommended that both Professors Duncan's and Nickel's treatises be read for a
more complete understanding of the three approaches. See Duncan, supra note 30; Nickel,
supra note 29.
60. See Nickel, supra note 29, at 545.
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tial policies often raise the specter of illiterate students, highway
patrolmen who do not know how to drive, teachers who cannot
handle children and surgeons who remove tonsils by cutting
throats."61 Both Professors Nickel and Duncan argue that such re-
sults will not occur if proper steps are taken to establish an effi-
cient affirmative action approach.
Professor Nickel suggests that "preferential policies should be
restricted to those who are adequately qualified, or who, with the
training provided, can become adequately qualified for the position
sought.6 2 If a person does not meet this basic test, then he cannot
be given a preference.6 3
Professor Duncan, on the other hand, after noting that "no af-
firmative action program with which [he is] familiar requires hiring
or accepting unqualified persons, '6 4 asserts that the lack of compe-
tency argument "fails because it is based on the false assumption
that in the absence of affirmative action positions are awarded on
the basis of merit."6 5 He states that because talented minorities
"have been kept from competing for positions, a true meritocracy
has never existed." '66 In support of his position, he points out that
the lack of competency objection has never been raised against vet-
erans preference programs or against decisions to admit students
to universities because their relatives are wealthy alumni6 7 Thus,
he argues, "a double standard is being applied to minorities in yet
another instance of discrimination."6' 8
Professor Duncan also argues that the evaluation of merit is
troublesome. In support of his argument he cites studies 9 which
demonstrate that school entrance exams should be reevaluated.
Professor Duncan's argument is premised on the belief that test
scores and grades are an inadequate measure of a person's abili-
ties,70 and that admissions criteria should include factors such as
human characteristics.71 He would redefine "competence" to reflect
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Duncan, supra note 30, at 531.
65. Id. at 529.
66. Id. at 529-30.
67. Id. at 531.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 530 n.94.
70. Id. at 530.
71. Id.
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the specific task that the individual being measured would be re-
quired to perform.72
Both Professors Nickel and Duncan agree that the way to over-
come the competency issue is to establish a minimum standard of
competency that must be met; all persons above that minimum
would be deemed qualified.73 In setting that standard, the mini-
mum level should be set high enough to eliminate the truly un-
qualified persons, but all above that level would be deemed quali-
fied regardless of the extent by which they exceed the minimum. 4
The use of the minimum level policy would allow one to hire the
person given the preference without selecting one who is
unqualified.75
However, finding the minimum level may not be easy. A higher
minimum level may be necessary where "small differences in com-
petence within the range of adequate competence can make a great
deal of difference in the level of performance. '76 For example,
"[flor gardeners, postal clerks, x-ray technicians and sales person-
nel, adequate competence may be sufficient; but in the case of sur-
geons, professional athletes and airline pilots, small differences in
competence can make a great difference, respectively, in lives
saved, games won, or crashes averted . . .77
An arguable weakness with the concept of minimum competence
is that it may lead to the selection of a person who has scored
lower than other candidates, a result contrary to traditional busi-
ness principles. In the United States, tradition dictates that those
who score highest are entitled to the position. Professor Duncan
attempts to refute this argument by noting that the award to the
one who scores highest assumes that an absolute merit standard is
implicit in the "awarding of societal benefits."78 He suggests alter-
72. Id. at 530-31. For example, he believes a black lawyer's "greater ability to meet the
needs of black clients ought to be factored into the competence calculation." Id. at 531. This
is a valid argument if the black lawyer does practice in the minority community. What
happens, however, if he does not choose this avenue? While there are other worthy argu-
ments to support the black applicant, this is a weak one.
73. Duncan, supra note 30, at 531; Nickel, supra note 29, at 545.
74. Duncan, supra note 30, at 531. See also Nickel, supra note 29, at 545. In other words,
while some may score higher above the minimum than others, all those above the minimum
are equally qualified.
75. Nickel, supra note 29, at 545.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Duncan, supra note 30, at 536.
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native methods of selection, such as by lottery or on a first come,
first served basis among those above the minimum level. 79 He rec-
ognizes, however, that there would be an outcry among those scor-
ing high.
While there is merit in the lottery or the first come, first served
approach, it might discourage persons from excelling. A person
may only strive to meet the minimum level, knowing that, outside
of his own personal pride and satisfaction, his reward for achieving
a higher competency is relegated to fate.
2. Preferential Programs May Create Unfair Burdens
Who is to bear the burden? Preferential programs may unfairly
place the burden on those who are excluded solely by the prefer-
ence. A person so excluded can argue that, while help may be
needed for the preferred person, the burden should not be placed
so unequally upon him. Professor Nickel argues that those with a
higher score may have "a prima facie right to be chosen." 80 He pro-
poses, however, that although this may be the best way, it is not
the only permissible way."' He suggests that either the first come,
first served or the lottery concepts, as proposed by Professor
Duncan, might be employed."2
Professor Nickel also suggests that a moral obligation might be
recognized. Thus, persons making the decision on the granting of
the position may be morally obligated to promote desirable social
goals so long as this could be accomplished without significant det-
riment to the program in which the position is available.83
The critical question remains, however, of why a small group,
those scoring higher, should bear the entire burden of a preference
program. Professor Nickel recognizes this problem and suggests
ways to reduce the burden. For example, tax revenues could be
used "to create more government jobs, to increase jobs in the pri-
vate sector, and to provide retirement benefits that will encourage
early retirement. 8 4 In addition, a certain number of available posi-
tions could be exempted from the preferential program. In this
79. Id.
80. Nickel, supra note 29, at 546.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 547.
84. Id. at 549.
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way those not in the preferred group would not be blocked from all
opportunities. 5
Still, none of these solutions completely satisfies the objections
of those who are asked to shoulder the burden. Consequently, Pro-
fessor Nickel states that, as to whatever unfairness cannot be alle-
viated, the nonpreferred must recognize "that society requires
them to live with reduced opportunities in order to meet its obliga-
tions."86 He supports this posture by pointing to war and highway
construction as classic examples of situations where some individu-
als must inevitably bear heavier burdens than others for the
greater good of society. 7
The Supreme Court addressed this principle of unequal sacrifice
for the benefit of society in Miller v. Schoene.as In Miller, certain
cedar trees were found to host cedar rust which, although not
harmful to cedar trees, threatened apple orchards two miles away.
Since apple growing is a major industry in Virginia, the General
Assembly of Virginia decided to destroy the cedar trees in order to
protect the apple trees. The Court found that the preference of one
class of property in order to save another which was of greater
value to the public in the judgment of the legislature was constitu-
tional. The Court held that "where the public interest is involved
preferment of that interest over the property interest of the indi-
vidual, to the extent even of its destruction, is one of the distin-
guishing characteristics of every exercise of the police power which
affects property."89 The reasoning of Miller could be applied to
preferential programs. As in Miller, preferential programs seek to
achieve benefits for the public good while placing economic bur-
dens on seemingly innocent parties.
III. THE HISTORY OF EQUAL PROTECTION
The basic constitutional issue raised by government programs
according preferential treatment to certain groups in society is that
of equal protection. In the case of minority groups, however, the
85. Id.
86. Id. (citing Thomson, Preferential Hiring, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 369 (1973)).
87. Id. This writer's experience supports the argument as to highway construction and
eminent domain. Most people do not want the highway to be built in a manner disruptive to
their lives. For example, added traffic or land condemnation inevitably inconveniences
persons.
88. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
89. Id. at 279-80.
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meaning of the equal protection clause has varied considerably
throughout history.
Prior to the Civil War, the United States supported the institu-
tion of slavery. The unequal treatment of blacks was constitution-
ally acceptable.90 After the Civil War, however, the fourteenth
amendment was ratified to insure that all persons would receive
equal protection.9 1 Since its enactment, however, scholars, histori-
ans and courts have debated the scope of its protection.
In essence, the fourteenth amendment
does not prevent the States from resorting to classification for pur-
poses of legislation .... But the classification must be reasonable,
not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having
a fair and substantial relation to the objects of the legislation, so
that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.
92
The fact that the amendment allowed the government to classify
meant that, by the very utilization of such classification, it could
create inequality between classes.9 3 Thus, while the amendment
pledges equal protection, at the same time it ostensibly allows the
creation of inequality. "In tackling this paradox the Court has
neither abandoned the demand for equality nor denied the legisla-
tive right to classify. It has taken a middle course. It has resolved
the contradictory demands of legislative specialization and consti-
tutional generality by a doctrine of reasonable classification.
9 4
This rational or reasonable basis approach was basic to the inter-
pretation of equal protection until World War II.
Traditionally, the fourteenth amendment supported only mini-
90. See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (10 How.) 393 (1856).
91. It should be noted that the Constitution also contains an equal protection guarantee
under the due process clause of the fifth amendment. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980). State actions violating the equal protection concept are challenged under the four-
teenth amendment, while those of the federal government pose fifth amendment challenges.
Note, Minority Business Enterprise Set-Aside: The Reverse Discrimination Challenge, 45
ALB. L. REv. 1139, 1143 (1981). "Equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is
the same as under the Fourteenth Amendment." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)
(citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975)). But see Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) ("The Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection
clause . . ").
92. Royster Gauno Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
93. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. v. Mathews, 174 U.S. 96, 106 (1899).
94. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REv. 341, 344
(1949).
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mal judicial intervention.95 This
"old" variety of equal protection scrutiny focused solely on the
means used by the legislature: it insisted merely that the classifica-
tion in the statute reasonably relate to the legislative purpose ....
[U]sually that rational classification requirement was readily satis-
fied: the courts did not demand a tight fit between classification and
purpose; perfect congruence between means and ends was not re-
quired . ... 9
While prior to World War II, the "Court displayed some willing-
ness to strike down racial classifications which, on their face, dis-
advantaged minorities," it was "willing to tolerate most other state
laws using race as a criterion. '97 Professor Phillips points out "that
neither the courts nor the other arms of government did much to
alter the structure of social forces which consigned blacks and
other racial minorities to a condition of social inferiority despite
their theoretically equal legal status." ' Clearly, neutrality99 was
the position of the Court.
Was this neutrality on the part of the Court justified and why
did it take this position? Arguably, the equal protection provisions
in the fourteenth amendment on their face were intended by its
drafters to be more than neutral. In 1866, the 39th Congress had
passed the Freedmens Bureau Act.100 This Act provided "race-con-
scious remedies and limitations."101 Because of the Freedmen's Bu-
reau Act, some commentators argue that it is "inconceivable that
the same Congress intended by its approval of the fourteenth
amendment on June 12, 1866, to validate and forbid remedies it
had labored so hard to pass. 10 2 Professor Jones submits that there
95. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 670 (10th ed. 1980).
96. Id.
97. Phillips, supra note 24, at 323.
98. Id.
99. The writer uses the term "neutral" to mean that the Court did not interpret the
amendment as providing preferential treatment. The Court did not take sides; it only deter-
mined that blacks were entitled to no more and no less than whites. This neutrality is
clearly demonstrated in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896). See infra notes 104-
08 and accompanying text.
100. 13 Stat. 507 (Mar. 3, 1865).
101. Jones, supra note 22, at 221. The most notorious race-conscious remedy provided by
the Freedmen's Bureau Act was the provision that set apart abandoned lands in the confed-
erate states for the "freedman." 13 Stat. 507, 508 (Mar. 3, 1865).
102. Jones, supra note 22, (citing G. BENTLEY, A HISTORY OF THE FREEDMAN'S BUREAU
(1955), among others).
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is no doubt that Congress intended 'that there be preferential
treatment for blacks, but. it was the decisions of the Supreme
Court that "eviscerated the reconstruction laws and the constitu-
tional amendments. ' 103 If the foregoing is true, the two principle
cases that achieved this reversal were the Civil Rights Cases0 4 and
Plessy v. Ferguson.105
In the Civil Rights Cases, in a well known passage, Justice Brad-
ley stated:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficient
legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state,
there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he
takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite
of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be
protected in the ordinary modes by which other men's rights are
protected.06
The Court reaffirmed this neutral approach thirteen years later in
Plessy v. Ferguson, where the Court upheld a state law requiring
separate railway carriages for whites and blacks. Justice Brown,
speaking for the majority, stated:
"[w]hen the government . .. has secured to each of its citizens
equal rights before the law and equal opportunities for improvement
and progress, it has accomplished the end for which it was organized
and performed all the functions respecting social advantages with
which it is endowed." Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial in-
stincts or to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences,
and the attempt to do so can only result in accentuating the difficul-
ties of the present situation. If the civil and political rights of both
races be equal one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politi-
cally. If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of
the United States cannot put them upon the same plane.10 7
Justice Harlan took the neutral approach a step further, employ-
ing it to argue against the validity of "separate but equal" legisla-
tion. In his dissent in Plessy, Justice Harlan introduced his well
known premise of a "color-blind" Constitution:
103. Jones, supra note 22, at 221.
104. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
105. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See Jones, supra note 22, at 222.
106. 109 U.S. at 25.
107. 163 U.S. at 551-52 (quoting People v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 448 (1883)).
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[I]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this
country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no
caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens
are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most pow-
erful. The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his sur-
roundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the
supreme law of the land are involved.10 8
This posture of neutrality continued until World War 11.109 Dur-
ing World War II, however, the Court abandoned the reasonable-
ness or rational basis test when dealing with race questions and
adopted a new standard. In Hirabayashi v. United States, °0 and
Korematsu v. United States,"' the Court was faced with the Japa-
nese exclusion and curfew issues.112 In Hirabayashi, the Court de-
clared that
[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are
by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are
founded upon the doctrine of equality. For that reason, legislative
classification or discrimination based on race alone has often been
held to be a denial of equal protection .... [R]acial discriminations
are in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited
113
One year later in Korematsu, the Court introduced the strict scru-
tiny approach to equal protection analysis of racial classifica-
tions."" In Korematsu, the Court found that "all legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immedi-
108. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Note that this concept was espoused by Justices
Rehnquist and Stevens in their dissent in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 522-23
(1980).
109. Phillips, supra note 24, at 322. Professor Phillips cites Justice Harlan's "color-blind"
premise in Plessy v. Ferguson and a case decided sixteen years before Plessy, Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), to support his position. In Strauder, the Court had held
that racial discrimination against whites was unconstitutional.
110. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
111. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
112. These cases arose out of President Roosevelt's 1942 executive order to the com-
mander of the west coast military area that was aimed at preventing possible espionage and
sabotage by Japanese-Americans. See Exec. Order No. 9,066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1938-1943
Comp.).
113. 320 U.S. at 100.
114. 323 U.S. at 216. The Court continued to apply the rational or reasonable basis stan-
dard to issues not having racial overtones. See GUNTHER, supra note 95, at 864.
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ately suspect. . . . [C]ourts must subject them to the most rigid
scrutiny.''11
5
Thus, the approach developed in the World War II exclusion
cases required strict scrutiny of racial classifications and the classi-
fication would be upheld only if (1) it would achieve a compelling
government objective and (2) there was no less restrictive alterna-
tive available to achieve that purpose. This resulted in only two
instances where the classification was upheld prior to 1980.116
IV. REACTION OF THE SUPREME COURT TO BENIGN RACIAL
CLASSIFICATIONS
The issue of preferential treatment is not totally new to the Su-
preme Court. It has dealt with the issue before in school desegrega-
tion117 and voter reapportionment cases."18 The issue of racial clas-
sifications for the purpose of affirmative action, however, did not
reach the Court until 1973 when a writ of certiorari was sought and
granted in the case Defunis v. Odeguard.11 9 This case and the four
other affirmative action cases1 20 since that time have left constitu-
tional scholars across the United States in confusion concerning
the status of benign classifications. 21 It is this writer's position
115. 323 U.S. at 216 (emphasis added). This new standard was suggested by Justice
Stone's footnote in United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Justice
Stone stated that "[t]here may be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of
the Constitution." However, he found it "unnecessary to consider now whether legislation
... is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of
the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation." Id. Carolene Products
dealt with the constitutionality of the Filled Milk Act which prohibited the interstate ship-
ment of "filled" milk. See generally Phillips, supra note 24, at 323; Note, supra note 91, at
1444 n.21.
116. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81 (1943). See Phillips, supra note 24, at 324-25. See generally L. TRIE, AhiERxcAN
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 994, 1000-01 (1978); Note, supra note 91, at 1145-46.
117. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (stating
that although quotas were not required, mathematical ratios were useful in shaping a
remedy).
118. See, e.g., United Jewish Org., Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (upholding reappor-
tionment scheme designed to permit certain numbers of minority representatives in the
New York state legislature); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (overturning a state
redistricting plan because it discriminated against blacks and Mexican-Americans).
119. 414 U.S. 1038 (1973).
120. Minnick v. California Dept. of Corrections, 452 U.S. 105 (1981); Fullilove v. Klutz-
nick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1977); Re-
gents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
121. See infra notes 125-42 and accompanying text. One contributing factor to the
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that the Court has not yet decided what rules are applicable to
benign classifications; consequently, its decisions betray what has
been called "a clear note of ambivalence. 1 22
In Defunis, the Court, after granting the writ of certiorari, de-
clared the case moot because the challenger of a law school's pref-
erential admission program was ready to graduate from law school
by the time the Court could act.123 It appeared that the Court
wished to gain additional experience with preferential treatment
125
programs. 124 The next case, Regents of the University of Califor-
nia v. Bakke, 25 involved a similar challenge to a medical school's
special admissions program. 26 In a five to four decision 27 authored
by Mr. Justice Powell but receiving little support from the other
justices,'2 s the Court applied the strict scrutiny test 29 and struck
Court's confusing posture may be its desire to review societal problems. Hence, a decision
that does not necessarily comport with legal logic may result. As Professor Mishkin articu-
lately asserts:
[T]he issues posed involve broad societal problems, and the decisions of the Court
have an impact that the justices cannot ignore (and probably should not if they
could). The demands of a wise or politic result may be in tension with the dictates of
principle. The issue of the constitutionality of affirmative action poses in particularly
intense form one stance of that conjuncture.
Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the Constitu-
tionality of Affirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 907 (1983) (Professor Mishkin was senior
author of the Brief for Petitioners in Bakke).
122. Mishkin, supra note 121, at 910.
123. DeFunis v. Odeguard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). It is puzzling that after being fully briefed
on the mootness issue before granting the petition for a writ of certiorari, the Court granted
the petition to hear the case on the merits and shortly thereafter decided the case was moot.
Either the Court was confused as to the proper approach or it was using a means of allowing
affirmative action programs to continue without the Court's official approval.
124. Mishkin, supra note 121, at 911-12.
125. 438 U.S. 265.
126. The University had set aside 16 places out of each class of 100 for qualified disad-
vantaged minority students. In defense of the program, the University argued that "discrim-
ination against members of the white 'majority' cannot be suspect if its purpose can be
characterized as 'benign.'" Id. at 294. Bakke, in part, argued the program operated to ex-
clude him on the basis of his race in violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteeneth amendment and title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1983).
127. It is arguable that it is not a 5-4 but a 4-1-4 decision. See Jones, supra note 22, at
232. There are actually six different opinions. See Duncan, supra note 30, at 504.
128. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun concurred in part and dissented in
part. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 267-68. The "Brennan Group" rejected Powell's strict scrutiny test,
believing it to be appropriate only when confronted with a classification that stigmatized the
group. Id. at 357. They advocated an "intermediate test" under which racial classifications
designed to further remedial purposes "must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Id. at 359 (quoting
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977), which quotes from Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197 (1976) (a sex discrimination case applying the intermediate standard)). Applying
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down the admission policy1 30 on constitutional grounds.131 At the
same time, however, the Court did recognize that race could be a
factor in the admissions process. 32 The divergent opinions of the
justices left considerable uncertainty as to the Court's approach to
benign classifications. 133
One year after Bakke, in United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber,134 the Court upheld an affirmative action plan involving job
training for blacks'3 5 yet side-stepped the opportunity to speak de-
finitively.1 36 In 1980, the Supreme Court handed down Fullilove v.
Klutznick,' 37 involving a challenge to a portion of the Federal Pub-
lic Works Employment Act which mandated that at least ten per-
cent of every public works grant go to minority business enter-
this test, the "Brennan Group" found the admissions program constitutional.
The remaining four justices (Burger, C.J., Stevens, Stewart & Rehnquist, J.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) voted to invalidate the program on statutory grounds, title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and therefore never reached the constitutional issue.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 408-21.
129. Id. at 291. Justice Powell asserted that the Court had "never approved a classifica-
tion that aids persons perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the expense
of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial, legislative or administrative findings
of constitutional or statutory violations." Id. at 307. See A- BICKEr, THE MORALITY OF CON-
SENT 133 (1975).
130. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 271.
131. Id. at 287.
132. Id. at 315-19. Powell asserted that race was only a "plus" and could "not insulate the
individual from comparison with all other candidates for the available seats." Id. at 317.
Thus, after establishing a neutral position on benign classifications by providing that the
same strict scrutiny test applied to benign as well as to invidious racial classifications, Pow-
ell then provided "considerable support for covertly race-based admissions preferences
through his actual utilization of that test." Phillips, supra note 24, at 332-33.
133. Professor Mishkin aptly stated that the Bakke opinion "as a whole amounted to a
proclamation of ambivalence that dramatically recognized and proclaimed the existence of
legitimate moral and constitutional claims on both sides of the issue." Mishkin, supra note
121, at 917. There is also the argument that the opinion did little but make the Regents
admit Bakke to medical school. See Duncan, supra note 30, at 504.
134. 443 U.S. 193 (1977).
135. Adopted as part of a collective bargaining agreement, the program provided for on-
the-job training for unskilled workers on a one-to-one basis, one black for each white se-
lected. The Fifth Circuit found the program violated title VI because it discriminated
against whites without a determination having been made against the company that it was
guilty of past discrimination. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 224
(5th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). In
a 5-2 decision the Court held that the plan did not violate title VI. Id., 443 U.S. at 195.
136. The Court held that its decision was directed solely towards voluntary affirmative
action plans in relation to title VII and did not involve state action under the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 200. For an excellent discussion of the
Weber case, see Meltzer, The Weber Case; The Judicial Abrogation of the Antidiscrimina-
tion Standard in Employment, 47 U. CHL L. REv. 423 (1980).
137. 448 U.S. 448.
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prises. Once again the Court was divided as to what level of
scrutiny to employ."8' Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger
explicitly rejected Bakke's strict scrutiny test and employed the
term "close examination" instead.3 9 It has been argued that the
Chief Justice's opinion stands for the concept that the Court will
"substantially defer" to schemes of Congress which employ benign
racial classifications for remedial purposes. 4 ° Thus, such congres-
sional schemes will not be subjected to the stringent level of judi-
cial examination ordinarily given racial classifications under the
strict scrutiny approach. Finally, in 1981, the Court confirmed its
ambivalent approach to benign classifications by dismissing Min-
nick v. California Department of Corrections'4' after it had al-
ready granted certiorari and after the case was fully briefed and
argued.'42
138. While rendering a 6-3 opinion upholding the program, the Court presented four dif-
ferent views, none of which was supported by a majority vote. Chief Justice Burger's posi-
tion is summarized infra note 140. Justice Powell, in a separate concurring opinion, em-
ployed the compelling interest standard, under which he deferred to Congress' powers and
held that Congress, unlike the Regents in Bakke, was "competent to make . . . findings
sufficient to uphold the use of a race-conscious remedy" in pursuit of the legitimate govern-
ment interest in dispelling identified discrimination. Id. at 497, 516. For a summary of Jus-
tice Powell's position, see Comment, Reverse Racial Preferences Under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause: Round II, 19 AM. Bus. L.J. 197, 206 n.87 (1981).
Justice Marshall, with Justices Brennan and Blackmun joining, wrote a concurring opin-
ion that employed the same rationale adopted by the "Brennan Group" in Bakke, 448 U.S.
at 517, in which they advocated the use of the intermediate test. See supra note 129.
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented and appeared to take the color-
blind constitution approach, where no distinctions should be allowed. Bakke, 448 U.S. at
525-26.
Justice Stevens also wrote in dissent, and appeared to adopt the strict scrutiny test. Id. at
532-54; see Jones, supra note 22, at 239; Phillips, supra note 24, at 339.
139. Bakke, 448 U.S. at 472. Chief Justice Burger asserted that a program that employs
racial or ethnic criteria, even in a remedial context, calls for close examination. Id. There are
close similarities between Chief Justice Burger's use of "close examination" and Justice
Brennan's "intermediate test." See Note, supra note 91, at 1160-61.
140. See Phillips, supra note 24, at 336.
141. 452 U.S. 105. Minnick involved allegations by two white males that the Department
of Correction's affirmative action plan unlawfully discriminated against white males and, as
a result, certain white males had been denied promotions.
142. Professor Mishkin has criticized the Minnick decision, stating that "[t]he somewhat
labored opinion cited 'significant ambiguities in the record' and relied on the fact that the
trial court proceedings in the case had taken place before the Supreme Court's decision in
Bakke." Mishkin, supra note 121, at 914 (citing Minnick, 452 U.S. at 127). As Professor
Mishkin points out, while the Court's holding may be technically supportable, "[ult is also
true, however, that the bases for this conclusion were generally available at the time of the
original decision to grant certiorari." Id. Originally at least four Justices believed the issue
in Minnick was ripe for decision. Apparently, three Justices changed their minds because
only Justice Stewart voted to decide it on the merits. Id.
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V. WHAT TEST IS TO BE EMPLOYED IN REVIEWING BENIGN
CLASSIFICATIONS?
Obviously, there is significant uncertainty on the Court as to
how benign classifications should be treated. Any attorney who un-
dertakes the task of outlining a constitutionally permissible affirm-
ative action plan, or attacking an affirmative action plan as being
unconstitutional, is faced with a significant burden.
Since the reader has been forewarned as to the inexactitude of
the treatment of benign classifications, the writer is willing to leap
into the breach with a recommendation for reviewing affirmative
action programs in the transportation construction industry.
A. Checklist for Review
The following questions must be reviewed, keeping in mind that
the answer to one may be dependent upon the answer to one or
more of the other questions.
1. Is there a compelling state interest or will the classification
serve important governmental objectives?
2. Does the body making the determination have the authority
to make the determination set out in the first inquiry above?
3. Has there been a finding of past racial discrimination that af-
fects present minority rules in the contract marketplace?
4. Is the means chosen to remedy the problem the least
intrusive?
5. Is the remedy temporary in nature?
6. Does the chosen remedy unnecessarily or improperly burden
innocent parties?
7. Are there circumstances that allow for a rational review of a
failure to meet the goal? If so, are there provisions for a waiver in
the event there is a bona fide reason for such failure?
B. Discussion and Support of the Checklist
1. Is there a compelling state interest or will the classification
serve important governmental objectives?
The answer to this inquiry will be aided by the answer to the
third question concerning whether there is evidence of past racial
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discrimination in the transportation contract field. The strength of
such evidence may be a determinative factor in deciding how com-
pelling or how important the governmental interest may be. This
issue will be further developed below in the interpretation of point
three.14
In Bakke,"' Justice Powell used a strict scrutiny test which re-
quired the interest of the decision-making body to be compel-
ling.' "5 He did, however, give credence to race as a "plus" factor to
be reviewed with other qualifications. 46 In Fullilove,47 Justice
Powell, while giving voice to the compelling interest standard, 48
avoided an absolute application of the strict scrutiny test by argu-
ing that dispelling racial discrimination can be compelling. 149 In
other words, while racial preference ordinarily cannot be supported
by a compelling interest, it can be if it is necessary to overcome
racial discrimination. This analysis is strikingly similar to Justice
Brennan's intermediate test, where benign classifications are nec-
essary to serve an important governmental objective. 5 °
Although Chief Justice Burger did not reach the issue in Bakke
or Fullilove, ostensibly, he rejects both the strict scrutiny and in-
termediate standards of review for benign racial classifications.' 5'
Nonetheless, he did call for a "close examination" of racial classifi-
cations. 52 His review in Fullilove followed the same line of review
usually employed when an intermediate standard is applicable. As
a result, he found that Congress need not be color-blind, 53 and if a
court could remedy past discrimination, then Congress, with its
legislative powers, should likewise be able to do so.15
Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall and White employed the
intermediate test in Bakke. 55 In Fullilove, the group also em-
ployed the intermediate level test, although Justice White joined
143. See infra notes 188-203 and accompanying text.
144. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
145. Id. at 291.
146. Id. at 317.
147. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
148. Id. at 497.
149. Id. 497-98.
150. See supra note 128.
151. Id. at 477.
152. Id. at 472.
153. Id. at 480.
154. Id. at 477-89.
155. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324-78. Note, however, that Justice White joined Justice Powell
in his strict scrutiny discussion. Id. at 487 n.7.
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Chief Justice Burger's opinion.156
The remaining three Justices, Stevens, Stewart and Rehnquist,
disposed of Bakke on statutory grounds without reaching the con-
stitutional issue. 1 7 In Fullilove, the three dissented, with Justices
Stewart and Rehnquist taking the color-blind approach, where ab-
solutely no distinctions are allowed, s while Justice Stevens ap-
peared to adopt the strict scrutiny test.1
5 9
This writer submits that Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun
and White have expressly adopted the intermediate level standard,
while Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell implicitly endorse it.
In light of this conclusion, the author recommends that the inter-
mediate standard be used only if there has been a finding of past
discrimination.
2. Does the body have the authority to make the determination
that there has been past discrimination and that a remedy is
required?
Justice Powell found that the Regents in Bakke did not have the
authority to make decisions regarding past racial discrimination
and remedial action. 60 He did not believe that isolated segments
of government were competent to make such decisions.' Con-
gress, on the other hand, did have the competency.162 This writer
believes that Justice Powell would only allow determinations re-
garding past discrimination to be made by (1) Congress, (2) an-
other legislative body or (3) a non-legislative body of government
that has been delegated that authority by the legislature. It should
be noted that Justice Powell would require strict scrutiny if a legis-
lative body other than Congress makes the decision. 163
Chief Justice Burger did not reach the issue of what body of gov-
ernment was making the decision in Bakke, but gave great defer-
ence to Congress in Fullilove.64 Justice White also joined the
156. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 517.
157. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 408-21. Chief Justice Burger joined in their view.
158. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 525-26.
159. Id. at 533-55.
160. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 515 n.14.
164. Id. at 473-76.
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Chief Justice in this view. 165
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and White supported the
Regents' decision in Bakke. 66 They believed that the power to
make such a decision had been given to the Regents by the Califor-
nia Constitution.'1 7 Consequently, they found nothing that re-
quired the Court to limit the scope of the Regents' powers more
narrowly than it had been limited by the California Assembly.168
Justices Stevens, Stewart and Rehnquist never reached this issue
in Bakke. 69 In Fullilove, they dissented and once again never ad-
dressed the issue.
Who, then, enjoys the authority to make the finding of past dis-
crimination and the consequent need for a remedy? 70 Obviously,
Justice Powell did not believe that such authority should be availa-
ble to everyone. He was concerned with the concept that "all insti-
tutions throughout the nation could grant [preference] at their
pleasure to whatever groups are perceived as victims of societal
discrimination. 1 7 1
The lower courts have been divided on what body has the au-
thority. In candor, they have received little guidance from the Su-
preme Court. 2 In Central Alabama Paving, Inc. v. James,7  the
court found that the United States Department of Transportation
was not "expressly empowered by Congress to impose such prefer-
ential classifications."'' 7 In contrast, in M.C. West, Inc. v. Lewis, 7 5
the court upheld the United States Secretary of Transportation's
authority on the basis that Executive Order 11,625 and the Small
Business Act provided a sufficient "chain of authority.' 71 6 In Local
35, IBEW v. City of Hartford,7 7 the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reviewed an affirmitive action ordinance adopted by the City
165. Id.
166. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324-78.
167. Id. at 366 n.42.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 408-21.
170. For a sound discussion on the issue, see Note, The Constitutionality of Affirmative
Action in Public Employment: Judicial Deference to Certain Politically Responsible Bod-
ies, 67 VA. L. REv. 1235 (1981).
171. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310.
172. See Drabkin, supra note 7, at 440 (arguing that there is "no guidance").
173. 499 F. Supp. 629 (M.D. Ala. 1980).
174. Id. at 636.
175. 522 F. Supp. 338 (M.D. Tenn. 1981).
176. Id. at 346.
177. 625 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1980).
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Council of Hartford, Connecticut and found it met Justice Powell's
Bakke test. It held that the City Council was a "competent and
responsive legislative body subject to political restraints.' 17 8 In De-
troit Police Officers' Association v. Young,179 the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals, after endorsing Justice Brennan's opinion as the
one offering "the most reasonable guidance,"180 found the Board of
Police Commissioners was a "public body" that was competent to
make findings of past discrimination.181 The case of Ohio Contrac-
tors Association v. Keip 182 involved a decision by the Ohio Gen-
eral Assembly to set aside specific percentages of the total number
of contracts and subcontracts for construction, supply and material
contracts. The court did not believe that Justice Powell's remarks
about the "unique" power of Congress to act limited such acts
solely to that body. The court found that
[n]o enabling provision is required to authorize a state government
to enact legislation to prevent the denial of equal protection to per-
sons within its jurisdiction. The prohibition against denial of equal
protection carries with it the power to prevent such denial and to
remedy past violations. When a state legislature takes steps in com-
pliance with the equal protection clause it is acting in the same ca-
pacity as that of Congress in adopting legislation to implement the
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's due process
clause. 183
In Michigan Road Builders Association v. Milliken,18 4 the court
noted that the plaintiffs did not argue that the Michigan legisla-
ture was an inappropriate body for such decisions. The court fur-
ther noted that the degree of review accorded a race-conscious
remedy depends upon the body creating the remedy. 8 5 Finally, in
the recent case of South Florida Chapter of the Associated Gen-
eral Contractors, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, Florida,186
the court found Fullilove did not restrict the power to make find-
ings of past discrimination to Congress. The court held that a
178. Id. at 421.
179. 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981).
180. Id. at 694.
181. Id.
182. 713 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1983).
183. Id. at 172.
184. 571 F. Supp. 173, 177 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
185. Id.
186. 723 F.2d 846 (11th Cir. 1984).
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county commission "was competent as a matter of State law to
make findings of past discrimination and to enact remedial
legislation."187
3. Has there been a finding of past racial discrimination that af-
fects present minority roles in the contract market place?
This issue has been treated with varying importance by the
courts. In Bakke, Justice Powell found not only that the Regents
were incompetent to make such findings but, in fact, no findings
had been made.18  Justice Brennan's group, 18 9 on the other hand,
rejected the need for a finding of individual discrimination. 90 Jus-
tice Brennan thought it sufficient if "each recipient [was] within a
general class of persons likely to have been the victims of discrimi-
nation." 191 Furthermore, Justice Brennan did not believe that it
was necessary that the body employing the remedy find that the
body itself had discriminated. 192 Finally, Justice Brennan's group
asserted that states may "adopt race-conscious programs designed
to overcome substantial, chronic minority underrepresentation
where there is reason to believe that the evil addressed is a product
of past racial discrimination." 93 The remaining justices did not
reach the issue because they decided the question on statutory
grounds.
In Fullilove, the Chief Justice found that Congress had made a
determination of past discrimination.' More importantly, how-
ever, he rejected the notion that Congress had to compile a "rec-
ord" supporting such a finding in the same manner as a judicial
body."'95 This view was supported by Justice Powell. 96 Justices
Marshall, Brennan and Blackmun found that Congress had a
"sound basis" for findings of past discrimination, 97 and that par-
ticularized findings were unnecessary. 9 8
187. Id. at 852.
188. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309.
189. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun. See supra note 128.
190. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 363.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 365, 369.
193. Id. at 366.
194. Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448.
195. Id. at 477-78.
196. Id. at 502-03.
197. Id. at 520.
198. Id. at 520 n.4.
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The lower federal courts have not had difficulty with this issue
once they have found the body advancing the remedy was compe-
tent to offer the remedy. In Michigan Road Builders, the Court
found that a legislative body need not make specific findings of
past discrimination. 19 9 "[I]t may relay [sic] upon any evidence
which logically supports the inference of prior discrimination. '" 200
The court in Ohio Contractors201 found that the Chief Justice's de-
termination that Congress need not compile a record like a judicial
or an administrative body also applied to state legislatures.20 2 Fi-
nally, in South Florida Chapter the Court held that the body mak-
ing the determination need not find that it (the body) had discrim-
inated; it had to determine only that there had been discrimination
against the minority in the past.203
4. Are means chosen to remedy the problem the least intrusive?
In Bakke, Justice Brennan's group20 4 found that for the remedy
to be valid, it need only be "substantially related" to the achieve-
ment of its objective.0 5 In Fullilove, however, the Chief Justice
stated that the means employed as a remedy must be more thor-
oughly reviewed. 206 He believed that "any Congressional program
that employs racial or ethnic criteria to accomplish the objective of
remedying the present effects of past discrimination should be nar-
rowly tailored to the achievement of that goal. ' 207 Justice Powell
did not believe that such "remedial plans" must be "limited to the
least restrictive means of implementation. '"208 Even so, he sug-
gested that the congressional remedy utilized in Fullilove met the
least restrictive means test because (1) there was a waiver provi-
sion,20 9 (2) it was of limited duration 2 0 and (3) it had a limited
impact on innocent third parties.2 "
199. Michigan Road Builders, 571 F. Supp. at 178.
200. Id. See also Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1981) (findings of previous
statutory violations of title VI satisfied use of race-conscious remedy).
201. 713 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1983).
202. Id. at 170-72.
203. South Fla. Chapter, 723 F.2d at 852-53.
204. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun. See supra note 129.
205. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359.
206. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 480.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 508. See also Ohio Contractors, 713 F.2d at 174.
209. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 481-82.
210. Id. at 489.
211. Id. at 486, 489. Cf. Michigan Road Builders, 571 F. Supp. at 189 (stating that Fulli-
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In South Florida Chapter, the Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit found that sufficient safeguards had been employed in
the county ordinance challenged in that case to meet the tailoring
requirement.212 The court noted (1) the type of review process the
county used to approve race-conscious measures, (2) the fact that
annual reassessment of the program would be made and this could
result in an abrogation of a particular course of action, and (3) that
there was no impermissible infringement upon innocent third
parties.2 13
The district court, on the other hand, had determined that the
county's set-aside provision was not acceptable because less intru-
sive alternatives were available to accomplish the goals." 4 The cir-
cuit court overruled, holding that "[t]he County was not required
to choose the least restrictive remedy available ....
The foregoing suggests that there are three specific factors to
consider when determining whether a particular remedy meets
constitutional muster. These factors are considered in detail
below. 216
5. Is the remedy temporary in nature?
This issue arises in determining whether the means employed as
a remedy are properly tailored. Chief Justice Burger employed this
concept in Fulliloe 21 7 when he determined that the means should
be narrowly tailored to achieve the goal.218 A limited or specified
duration for the remedy demonstrates that the means employed
will be utilized only so long as they are required to remedy past
discrimination.219 Justice Powell accepted this test as a part of the
inquiry into the means employed.220
Subsequent federal court cases have discussed the propriety of
this test. In Michigan Road Builders,221 the court found that no-
love does not require that remedial act be of limited duration).
212. South Fla. Chapter, 723 F.2d at 853-54.
213. Id. at 853-56.
214. 552 F. Supp. 909, 935-36 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
215. 723 F.2d at 856 (citing Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 528 (Powell, J., concurring)).
216. See infra notes 217-49 and accompanying text.
217. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 488.
218. Id. at 480.
219. Id. at 489.
220. Id. at 510.
221. Michigan Road Builders, 571 F. Supp. 173.
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where in Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Fullilove did he require
that a "remedial act be of limited duration. '222 The court inter-
preted the Chief Justice as only requiring that a "reassessment" or
"re-evaluation" be made by the body employing the means.223
The court in South Florida Chapter reached a similar conclu-
sion. It held that "[a]lthough no definite expiration date is speci-
fied, the Board is obligated to review the program annually to as-
sess whether it should be continued or modified, and such a review
adequately guarantees that the program will not be continued be-
yond its demonstrated need. ' 224 The court in Ohio Contractors
also supports this approach.225
In summary, it appears that the plurality of the Supreme Court
and the federal circuit courts have reached the conclusion that ab-
solute, definitive time limits are not required. Instead, the means
employed must be periodically reviewed in order to assure that
they will not extend beyond the time that is required to remedy
past discrimination.
6. Does the chosen remedy unnecessarily or improperly burden in-
nocent parties?
In Bakke, Justice Powell initially employed the strict scrutiny
test which, in practice, would prevent any person from receiving
preferential treatment. Thus, no innocent party would be bur-
dened. Later in the opinion, however, Justice Powell weakened his
application of the strict scrutiny test by providing that race could
"be a factor, although not the sole factor, in a program.
2 6
In Fullilove, Chief Justice Burger conceded that, in providing a
race-conscious remedy, some contracts would be awarded to minor-
ity business enterprises that might otherwise go to majority
firms.227 He determined, however, that it was not a constitutional
defect in such a program if certain majority contractors were dis-
appointed. 228 The Chief Justice stated that "[s]uch a 'sharing of
the burden' by innocent parties is not impermissible. ' '229 The scope
222. Id. at 189.
223. Id. at 190.
224. South Fla. Chapter, 723 F.2d at 854.
225. Ohio Contractors, 713 F.2d at 175.
226. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318.
227. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 484.
228. Id.
229. Id. (quoting Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976)).
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of the program in Fullilove was so limited (ten percent) that its
impact on majority contractors was negligible because ninety per-
cent of the funding was still available for competition by all con-
tractors.230 In addition, parties other than minorities, although
themselves innocent of any discriminatory conduct, "may have
reaped competitive benefit over the years from the virtual exclu-
sion of minority firms from these contracting opportunities."2 31
In Fullilove, Justice Powell, likewise, did not find the burden on
third parties to be too great.232 The funds remaining in open com-
petition made the impact so widely dispersed that no one person
suffered disproportionately.233 Justice Powell noted, however, that
set asides may not always be an appropriate remedy.234
Several lower federal courts have interpreted the Fullilove deci-
sion. In Ohio Contractors, the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the dis-
trict court that Ohio's disadvantaged business enterprise provi-
sions imposed an impermissible burden on non-minority
contractors.2 35 The Sixth Circuit held that "the majority can be
required to bear some of the burden which inevitably results from
affirmative efforts to rectify past discrimination. '"23 The court fol-
lowed Chief Justice Burger's reasoning that a reasonable burden
was justified since non-minorities had previously reaped competi-
tive benefits from past discrimination practices.231 The court ac-
knowledged, however, that an affirmative action plan could not be
used if it unnecessarily trammeled the interests of majority
contractors.2 38
In Michigan Road Builders, the court held that, although there
was an inevitable impact on non-minorities, it was not a significant
burden "in light of the scope of the program" as compared to all
available contracts.239
In South Florida Chapter, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with
the district court that the impact of single contracts must be
230. Id. at 484-85 n.72.
231. Id. at 485.
232. Id. at 514-15 (Powell, J., concurring).
233. Id. at 515.
234. Id. at 515 n.14.
235. Ohio Contractors, 713 F.2d at 173.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. (quoting Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981)).
239. Michigan Road Builders, 571 F. Supp. at 187.
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viewed in isolation from the overall contracting program.2 40 The
court noted that "[a]ll three opinions in Fullilove voting to uphold
the statute compared the 10% figure in the statute to the total
expenditures by the United States government on construction
contracts." '241 Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a "100%
set-aside" for a particular county construction contract since it
constituted only six tenths of one percent of all county contracts
over a ten year period242 and did not unfairly impact on third
party non-minorities.243 In addition, the court noted that non-mi-
norities were not wholly excluded from the one percentage value
set aside from minorities. A minority contractor could still be part-
ners with a non-minority contractor and qualify to bid, as long as
the non-minority did not control over forty-nine percent of the mi-
nority company. Thus, on the face of the program, it was possible
for a non-minority to share forty-nine percent of the six tenths of
one percent.244
In summary, it appears that the amount targeted for minorities
is to be compared with the overall contracting program and not
reviewed in isolation. This writer submits, however, that the pro-
gram suggested by the Federal Highway Administration in accor-
dance with the mandate of the Surface Transportation Assistance
Act could have an unwarranted impact on small non-minority con-
tractors. For example, a prime contractor, in order to meet his
goal, may set up a small specialty portion of his contract to be
performed by minorities. Thus, he may provide that he will give
any guardrail or hauling work on a project only to minority con-
tractors. If all other prime contractors take this same course of ac-
tion, all of a particular specialty field will be dominated by minori-
ties. Small non-minorities, therefore, could be effectively foreclosed
from bidding unless, of course, they merge with a minority and al-
low the minority to have a controlling interest in the company. In
light of this potential impact, it is suggested that periodic reviews
be made to monitor and preclude such a result. It is also suggested
that the history of affirmative action programs would dictate
against allowing prime contractors to "load" certain areas of a con-
tract. For the DBE program to be truly effective, DBE's must learn
240. South Fla. Chapter, 723 F.2d at 855.
241. Id. at 855 n.12.
242. Id. at 855.
243. Id. at 856.
244. Id. at 856 n.15.
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all phases of construction; they must not become limited to, or iso-
lated in, a given field.
7. Are there circumstances that would allow a waiver of the goal
in the event that no qualified minorities can be found or hired?
Chief Justice Burger recognized in Fullilove that a waiver provi-
sion existed could be utilized in the event that, "despite affirmative
efforts, [the goal] cannot be achieved without departing from the
objectives of the program. ' '245 This waiver provision could be used
to prevent a minority from exploiting an opportunity to charge an
"unreasonable price, i.e., a price not attributable to the present ef-
fects of past discrimination.""24 Justice Powell acknowledged that,
without the possibility of waiver, it might be unfair to apply a rigid
goal "where minority group members constitute a small percentage
of the population. 2 47
The federal circuit courts have recognized the importance of a
waiver provision. In South Florida Chapter, for example, the Elev-
enth Circuit quoted Powell's opinion in Fullilove and acknowl-
edged that a rigid goal could prove unfair.2 48 In Ohio Contractors,
the court noted that the goals were not inflexible because a waiver
was available if it could be demonstrated that after good faith ef-
forts the goal could not be reached.249
VI. APPLICABILITY OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS TO AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION
A significant error is made and perpetuated when an attorney
faced with a due process or equal protection question reviews only
the United States Constitution. As Justice Brennan stated, "state
courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full
protection of the Federal Constitution. State constitutions, too are
a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending be-
yond those required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of fed-
eral law. 2 °5 0 He further noted that a number of recent state su-
245. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 481-82.
246. Id. at 488.
247. Id. at 514.
248. South Fla. Chapter, 723 F.2d at 856.
249. Ohio Contractors, 713 F.2d at 174.
250. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L.
REv. 489, 491 (1977).
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preme court decisions demonstrate that a state court is entirely
free to read its own constitution more broadly than the Supreme
Court reads the federal Constitution, or to reject the mode of anal-
ysis used by the Supreme Court in favor of a different analysis of
corresponding state constitutional guarantees.25'
The interpretation of the particular state constitution is for state
courts; the Supreme Court of the United States lacks the jurisdic-
tion to review state court decisions that address solely state consti-
tutional issues.252 Only when the interpretation of a state constitu-
tional issue also involves a question of federal law may the
Supreme Court of the United States become involved. Justice
Brennan cites with approval the case of People v. Disbrow,25
wherein the court stated "[w]e pause finally to reaffirm the inde-
pendent nature of the California Constitution and our responsibil-
ity to separately define and protect the rights of California citizens
despite conflicting decisions of the United States Supreme Court
interpreting the federal constitution."
California is not the only state that has made the decision to
look primarily to its own constitution in order to interpret the
rights and privileges of its citizens. Other states, such as Michigan,
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, are representative of a growing
number of states that have manifested their reliance on their own
state constitutions, rather than constantly deferring to the United
States Constitution.254
In summary, Justice Brennan encourages the states to recognize
that they have an obligation to their citizens under their state con-
stitutions, and to recognize that automatic deferral to the federal
Constitution is not an acceptable course of action. Equal recogni-
tion must be given to both documents. "The decisions of the [Su-
preme] Court are not, and should not be, dispositive of questions
regarding rights guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state
law. 2 55
251. Id. at 495-502. But see infra note 257 and accompanying text (equal protection
clause in Virginia is no broader than the federal constitutional provisions. Archer v. Mayes,
213 Va. 633, 194 S.E.2d 707 (1973)).
252. Brennan, supra note 250, at 501.
253. 16 Cal. 3d 101, 114-15, 545 P.2d 272, 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 368 (1976).
254. People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 878 (1975);
State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975); Commonwealth v. Campana, 455 Pa. 622,
314 A.2d 854, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974).
255. Brennan, supra note 250, at 502.
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As an example of provisions in state constitutions concerning
discrimination, article I, section 11 of the Constitution of Virginia
provides, among other things, that the citizens of Virginia are enti-
tled to be free from any governmental discrimination based upon
race.2 56 Many states have similar provisions in their constitutions;
counsel should examine state law to determine if an interpretation
by federal courts of the federal Constitution can provide guidance
in interpreting the state constitution. In Virginia, the supreme
court held in Archer v. Mayes257 that Virginia's equal protection
clause is no broader than the fourteenth amendment and, there-
fore, outlaws only discrimination impermissible under the federal
Constitution. Thus, the Supreme Court of Virginia will look to the
federal Constitution's equal protection clause, and the cases inter-
preting that clause, to determine the proper scope of Virginia's
equal protection clause.
Obviously, the manner in which different states perceive and in-
terpret the applicability of the United States Constitution to their
own state constitutions will vary. Whether a state adheres to Jus-
tice Brennan's view or the position taken by Virginia is absolutely
crucial toward making any evaluation of an affirmative action plan.
VII. STATE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Once an attorney has determined the applicability of both fed-
eral and state constitutional provisions relating to equal protection
and the application of those principles to benign racial classifica-
tions, he must go a step further. Even though state constitutional
provisions may authorize benign classifications, they most likely
are not self-executing. Rather, they only grant power to the execu-
tive or legislative branches to enact specific provisions for carrying
out the constitutional precepts. The actual implementation of pro-
grams is found in state statutes and not the state constitution. In
reviewing those statutes, it must be determined who has the au-
thority, if anyone, to implement provisions concerning racial classi-
fications; this determination is a vital linchpin under the teachings
of Fullilove.258 Under Fullilove, the person implementing benign
256. In his commentaries on the Virginia Constitution, A.E. Dick Howard has intimated
that the drafters intended, by the use of such language, to prevent any governmental dis-
crimination based upon race, regardless of its benign or remedial purpose. A. HOWARD, 1
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 234 (1974).
257. 213 Va. 633, 638, 194 S.E.2d 707, 711 (1973).
258. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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classifications must be a body competent to make that determina-
tion.259 Not only must the body be a politically sensitive one, but it
must also be one not prohibited from acting by federal statutes or
state statutes and constitutions.
Under Virginia law, for example, if an agency of the state moves
to implement benign racial classifications, both the Virginia Con-
stitution and provisions of the General Assembly must be re-
viewed.260 There are a number of references contained in the Code
of Virginia which establish anti-discrimination principles.2 61 More
importantly, however, because the implementation of the provi-
sions of the STAA involves contracting, the Virginia Public Pro-
curement Act262 must be reviewed.
Under the Virginia Public Procurement Act, procurement must
be accomplished generally by either competitive sealed bidding or
competitive negotiation, unless otherwise authorized by law.26 The
Act does provide, however, that "[a]ll public bodies shall establish
programs consistent with all provisions of this chapter to facilitate
the participation of small businesses and businesses owned by
women and minorities in procurement transactions. 26 4 Neverthe-
less, under section 11-44, the Act provides that "[i]n the solicita-
tion or awarding of contracts no public body shall discriminate be-
cause of the race . . . of the bidder or offeror." Furthermore,
section 11-51 provides that contractors must agree not to "discrim-
inate against any employee or applicant for employment because of
race ....
There are also provisions that set out the principle that competi-
tion is important in order to obtain a low price for the goods or
services required by an agency.265 For example, the General Assem-
259. See id. at 473.
260. For a discussion of the Virginia Constitution, see supra notes 256-57 and accompa-
nying text.
261. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 11-44 (Cum. Supp. 1984) (prohibits discrimination in the
solicitation or awarding of state contracts); id. § 2.1-374 (Repl. Vol. 1978 & Cum. Supp.
1984) (declaration of policy to eliminate discrimination from employment practices of gov-
ernment contractors); id. § 2.1-376 (Repl. Vol. 1978 & Cum. Supp. 1984) (requires govern-
ment contracts to include nondiscrimination clause).
262. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-35 to -80 (Cum. Supp. 1984). Many states have provisions that
the bid must go to the lowest responsible bidder. A determination, therefore, must be made
whether benign classifications which provide for minority set-asides are in contravention of
the procurement act or provisions of the particular state.
263. Id. §§ 11-41.1, -44.
264. Id. § 11-48.
265. Id. §§ 11-35 to -80.
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bly has provided that "competition be sought to the maximum fea-
sible degree" to the end that "all procurement procedures be con-
ducted in a fair and impartial manner. .. [and] that all qualified
vendors have access to public business and that no offeror be arbi-
trarily or capriciously excluded . . . ."I" Furthermore, all public
contracts, with certain exceptions not here relevant, can be let only
after competitive sealed bidding or competitive negotiations.267
Under section 11-37, if competitive sealed bidding is utilized, the
award must go to the lowest responsive and responsible bidder.
Similarly, under that same section, if competitive negotiation is
utilized and if the person is both responsible and responsive, price
is a matter to be considered although it is not to be the sole
determinant.6 8
The foregoing provisions, therefore, provide that the determin-
ing factor in an award is competition. The interjection of a benign
classification favoring a bidder eliminates competition to a certain
extent. Preferred persons do not compete with all other bidders.
They only compete with other DBE's. Thus, under the foregoing
provisions, benign racial classifications would not be permitted.
Accordingly, if the previous sections were the only provisions en-
acted by the Virginia General Assembly, benign racial classifica-
tions, offering preference to minorities or women, would not be
permitted. There are exceptions to the above procedures, however,
which may also exist in other states across the nation.
In Virginia, the General Assembly has provided the State High-
way and Transportation Commission with a "general consent" pro-
vision under section 33.1-12 of the Code, whereby the Commission
can take whatever steps are necessary to gain federal aid. Many
states have these same "general consent" provisions. In addition,
the Virginia General Assembly has provided that when a
procurement transaction involves the expenditure of federal assis-
tance or contract funds, the receipt of which is conditioned upon
compliance with the mandatory requirements in federal laws or reg-
ulations not in conformance with the provisions of this chapter [the
266. Id. § 11-35(g).
267. Id. § 11-41.1
268. A responsible bidder is a person who has "the capability, in all respects, to perform
fully the contract requirements and the moral and business integrity and reliability which
will assure good faith performance ...... Id. § 11-37. Under that same section a responsive
bidder is "a person who has submitted a bid which conforms in all material respects to the
Invitation to Bid." Id.
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Virginia Public Procurement Act], a public body may comply with
such federal requirements, notwithstanding the provisions of this
chapter, only upon the written determination of the Governor, in
the case of state agencies, or the governing body, in the case of polit-
ical subdivisions, that acceptance of the grant or contract funds
under the applicable conditions is in the public interest 6 9
Accordingly, since the STAA has mandated that states must have
affirmative action programs that provide certain preferences to
DBE's, and the failure of the state to follow these federal provi-
sions will proscribe the state from an entitlement to federal aid
under the STAA, it is this writer's opinion that the Commonwealth
of Virginia, under sections 33.1-12 and 11-39 of the Virginia Code,
may take steps to enact affirmative action measures providing
preferences to DBE's in order to take advantage of the federal aid
offered under the STAA.
Although this discussion has been limited solely to Virginia stat-
utory procedures, it is suggested that the same analysis will prove
fruitful to those states attempting to justify affirmative action
preferential programs in order to comply with the STAA.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In summary, a transportation attorney reviewing an affirmative
action program for state transportation construction must evaluate
the terms of the program from several perspectives. First, one
should consider it from the practical point of view of how its goals
can best be achieved. Is the program one that will encourage
DBE's to establish themselves and learn to compete in the future
without benefit of preferential treatment, or is it one that merely
fosters dependence on preferential treatment? Second, one must
analyze such a program from a constitutional standpoint. As high-
lighted in this article, there is no explicit agreement within the Su-
preme Court as to the level of scrutiny applicable to benign racial
classifications. In spite of this absence of definitive guidance, how-
ever, the Court's indications are clear that an affirmative action
plan should be narrowly tailored to its objectives. In determining
whether a particular program is sufficiently tailored, the checklist
provided above should prove helpful. The reviewing attorney must
also consider an affirmative action plan in light of the particular
269. Id. § 11-39.
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state's constitution since its protections of individual liberties may
be broader than those of the federal Constitution. Finally, one
must examine state statutory authority for an affirmative action
program.
The issue of benign racial classifications raises many difficult
questions which elude definitive answers. It is hoped, however, that
the foregoing framework of analysis can alleviate some of the con-
fusion for the practicing attorney faced with the task of evaluating
the terms of a specific state affirmative action program.
